Confiança dos investidores vencedores

da perspectiva da criação de valor do acionista, a indústria de petróleo e gás parece ter muito para apoiá -lo. A descoberta e o desenvolvimento das principais novas reservas aumentaram substancialmente o acesso do setor aos recursos na última década. Os balanços das empresas mostram bilhões de dólares disponíveis para financiar investimentos. Os custos de produção do setor geralmente caíram, impulsionados pela inovação tecnológica e pela adoção de processos de fabricação mais eficientes. E embora a demanda por hidrocarbonetos como uma porcentagem da demanda geral de energia primária esteja prevista para cair nas próximas décadas, os volumes necessários para atender à demanda ainda serão enormes. Em relação a outras indústrias, o petróleo e o gás tem sido um retardado decidido na frente do Total Totholder Return (TSR). (Consulte “Os componentes do TSR.”)

But investors have been largely underwhelmed. Relative to other industries, oil and gas has been a decided laggard on the total shareholder return (TSR) front. (See “The Components of TSR.”)

de fato, entre as 33 faixas do BCG da indústria, o petróleo e o gás têm o pior TSR mediano de cinco anos. (Consulte Anexo 1.) E a participação do setor no índice S&P 500, que é baseada na capitalização de mercado, está diminuindo. E o que essas empresas devem fazer para voltar ao caminho certo?

What accounts for the industry’s poor showing among investors? And what must these companies do to put themselves back on the right path?

Uma mistura de desafios

Investors’ wariness toward oil and gas companies is largely attributable to five factors, each of which heightens the perceived risk to the companies’ business performance and TSR. The first is oil price uncertainty. Although prices have bounced back from their extreme lows of the past few years, there is little confidence among investors that prices have additional potential for significant appreciation. Such worries have been exacerbated by concerns about both supply and demand. On the supply side, rising US production of unconventional energy sources has upended traditional assumptions associated with oil prices and OPEC market management, dampening investors’ expectations regarding oil’s long-term price upside. In terms of demand, investors fret about the possible effects of worldwide recession and intensifying trade wars, as well as the effects of an evolving energy backdrop on the long-term demand for hydrocarbons.

The second factor that gives investors pause is the ongoing transition of the global energy system. A secular shift from hydrocarbons is possibly in motion, and this shift could have major implications for the industry’s profitability and business model. (Furthermore, oil and gas investors have noted, in conjunction, the rising prevalence of government policies designed to speed the adoption of green energy, coupled with falling costs for associated technologies.) To be sure, most observers expect that the demand for hydrocarbons will remain robust for the foreseeable future. But investors don’t have to look far to find reasons to worry about the longer term, and the industry has yet to formulate an effective and compelling response to assuage their concerns.

O terceiro fator que preocupa os investidores está crescendo em um debate sobre a "licença social para operar" das empresas de petróleo e gás. Although growing numbers of companies are establishing emissions targets and increasing the transparency of the environmental effects of their operations—consistent with guidelines established by the Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures and with pressures imposed by practitioners of so-called environmental, social, and governance (ESG) investing—many investors are worried that the steps don’t go far enough and that the industry still faces a major reckoning.

The O quarto fator que causa angústia entre os investidores é a sempre presente ameaça de agitação geopolítica. Tendências e desenvolvimentos, incluindo a reação contra a globalização em partes da Europa e dos EUA, a influência decrescente de instituições e parcerias internacionais estabelecidas há muito tempo e tensões comerciais entre os EUA e a China criaram crescentes incerteza sobre o crescimento econômico de longo prazo e o comércio global. Para o setor, a desconfiança permanente da gestão das empresas de petróleo e dúvidas sobre a capacidade das empresas de administrar dólares de investimento e gerenciar custos de maneiras que maximizam os retornos dos acionistas. A falta de disciplina de capital e controle de custos testemunhados durante o período de alto preço que prevaleceu antes de 2014-e a conseqüente erosão de retornos-prejudicou a confiança do investidor a essas empresas. As reivindicações subsequentes de maneiras consertadas não restauraram completamente a credibilidade do setor. Os investidores também desaprovaram a tendência do setor de comparar seu desempenho de TSR contra os de grupos estreitos de pares, em vez de setores e empresas que entregaram os mais altos retornos em geral. Eles colocaram maior ênfase nos programas de corte de custos, atualizações de qualidade da portfólio, redução de dívida, aumentos de pagamento e restauração da lucratividade. No entanto, TSRs teimosamente baixos sugerem que os investidores permanecem cautelosos com o retorno à desconfiança. Isso se traduz em pressão sobre as empresas para enfatizar os pagamentos e retornos dos acionistas de curto prazo, em vez dos tipos de programas de reinvestimento, portfólios de projetos e fusões e aquisições essenciais para a reposição de portfólio e a geração de crescimento de longo prazo em receitas e lucros. Se puderem conseguir isso, terão o capital suficiente e recuperarão a flexibilidade para tomar decisões de alocação de capital. Infelizmente, esse processo levará tempo.

The final factor dampening investors’ enthusiasm for the sector is lingering mistrust of oil company management and doubts about the companies’ ability to steward investment dollars and manage costs in ways that maximize shareholder returns. The lack of capital discipline and cost control witnessed during the high-oil-price period that prevailed prior to 2014—and the consequent erosion of returns—badly damaged investor confidence in these companies. Subsequent claims of mended ways have not fully restored the industry’s credibility.

Doubts about management’s intentions and ability to deliver have been exacerbated by the adherence by some oil and gas companies, particularly exploration and production (E&P) players, to incentivize structures that prioritize volumetric growth over shareholder returns. Investors have also frowned on the industry’s tendency to benchmark its TSR performance against those of narrow peer groups rather than sectors and companies that have delivered the highest returns overall.

Over the past few years, oil-and-gas-company executives have sought to address the credibility deficit by reordering their capital allocation priorities. They have placed greater emphasis on cost-cutting programs, portfolio quality upgrades, debt reduction, payout increases, and restoration of profitability. Nevertheless, stubbornly low TSRs suggest that investors remain wary of a return to profligacy.

The combination of worries about external factors and doubts about the sector’s stewardship of capital has created a vicious circle: the more uncertain the environment, the closer investors’ scrutiny of companies’ capital allocation decisions and the greater investors’ demand for immediate evidence of investment returns. This translates into pressure on companies to emphasize short-term shareholder payouts and returns rather than the types of reinvestment programs, project portfolios, and M&A that are essential for portfolio replenishment and the generation of long-term growth in revenues and profits.

Overcoming the investor trust deficit is, therefore, an imperative for oil and gas companies. If they can accomplish this, they will be assured sufficient capital and regain the flexibility to make capital allocation decisions. Unfortunately, this process will take time.

Desempenho divergente entre subsetores

Embora, coletivamente, as empresas de petróleo e gás tenham lutado, o desempenho da TSR dos subsetores do setor esteja longe de ser uniforme. (Veja o Anexo 2.) Uma revisão do TSR médio de cinco anos (ou seja, o TSR da empresa mediana desde o início de 2014 até o final de 2018), visto através das lentes de posição na cadeia de valor, tamanho da empresa e exposição regional ou ênfase, revela vários resultados notáveis. (Consulte “As empresas em nossa amostra.”)

Refining and Marketing Companies. R&M companies managed to generate respectable TSRs and led the list of oil and gas subsectors over the five-year period. While these businesses—like nearly all other oil and gas businesses—had to deal with falling revenues, they managed to generate relatively strong margin expansion, which, in turn, powered earnings growth superior to other subsectors.

International R&M players, which showed particular strength, generally benefited from their access to emerging markets’ growing demand for fuel. (See Exhibit 3.) For their part, R&M players that focused on North America reaped considerable advantage from their access to relatively inexpensive crude: pricing for crude from both Canada and the US was at times heavily discounted owing to transportation bottlenecks and limited export infrastructure, as well as US restrictions on oil exports through 2015. The R&M subsector’s generally favorable earnings growth environment allowed many players to execute payout and debt reduction strategies, further benefiting their relative TSR performance.

Globally, R&M companies benefited from continued rising demand for oil products: demand climbed about 8% over the five years, and global refining utilization rose strongly, reaching 83.5% in 2018. Fortunes varied, however. R&M players based in oil-exporting countries that support their refining industries with oil revenues—typically, government-owned national oil companies (NOCs)—saw their refining-utilization rates fall precipitously as weakness in oil prices prevailed through much of the period. This decrease in refining-utilization rates for R&M companies in these countries ultimately worked to the benefit of US and other Atlantic Basin R&M players, however: their revenues rose as they boosted exports of refined products to meet the resulting supply shortfall abroad. In many cases, the increase in sales helped compensate for soft demand in the home markets of these companies.

Refining margins are likely to rise a bit in 2020 as refiners scramble to meet the International Maritime Organization’s tightening standards for sulfur content in bunker fuel. Globally, however, spare refining capacity is expected to continue to increase through 2025, making it harder for these R&M companies to continue to grow their revenues.

Exploration and Production Companies. In contrast to their R&M counterparts, North America–exposed E&P players performed poorly over the five years, as well as over the three- and ten-year periods, with pure plays doing slightly better than diversified players. For companies that were able to achieve profit growth in a difficult oil price environment, a contraction of valuation multiples reversed nearly all potential TSR gains, reflecting the continued lack of investor confidence in the companies and their future earnings. This lack of confidence was fanned in particular in 2018, when a number of companies abandoned several years of capital-discipline rigor in the face of rising oil prices. Renewed concerns over these companies’ capital discipline stand to increase their already high financing costs—hardly a welcome development as these businesses seek to reestablish a winning trajectory, one that is not solely dependent on rallies in crude oil prices.

For diversified North America–exposed E&P companies, negative earnings and valuation multiple contractions were the culprits behind a median TSR of –11% over the five-year period. Boosts to cash returns to shareholders were the only positive drivers of TSR for these companies, and, for most of them, it was challenging to adhere to these programs while they wrestled with a continued free-cash-flow (FCF) crunch.

Among North America–exposed E&P players, ConocoPhillips stands out for its ability to generate relatively strong TSR in a difficult environment. Indeed, the company is one of only two in this cohort to have a positive TSR over the three-, five-, and ten-year periods. Central to its performance is the company’s stronger commitment to dividends—the company boasts dividend yields averaging 3.6% over the past ten years—and share buybacks than its peers. Investors have responded positively to the company’s ongoing divestment of noncore assets and reduction of its operating expenses. ConocoPhillips lowered its average per-barrel operating expenses by 15% (compared with its peers’ 12% reduction) from the beginning of 2016 through the end of 2018, yielding savings that helped drive a 26% increase in net margin over the same period.

ConocoPhillips’s performance suggests an evolution in TSR drivers in the E&P subsector. Investor payouts are playing an increasingly important role while earnings growth, the traditional lead factor in value creation, is becoming less critical. But E&P valuation multiples remain highly sensitive to earnings projections, suggesting that companies will need to strike a prudent balance between the two factors.

Supermajors. TSRs for the supermajors—BP, Chevron, ExxonMobil, Royal Dutch Shell, and Total—have improved modestly in recent years. The companies’ cost-cutting initiatives and portfolio repositioning have provided them a degree of insulation from challenging market conditions. Their global footprint, diversified operations, and sheer size have helped as well. But ultimately, these advantages have been no match for the challenges imposed by decreases in crude prices.

In examining the supermajors’ TSR performance over various time periods, we noted several defining features. The first is the inability of any of the companies to distinguish itself significantly over longer time horizons. During the ten-year period, for example, as earnings growth languished for all, players attempted to support their TSRs by emphasizing margin growth, multiple expansion, and payouts to investors, exploiting the three approaches in different ways, to different degrees, and with different levels of success. The results for Chevron and Royal Dutch Shell were the best overall, but neither company achieved breakout performance.

The TSR performance range widened a bit over the three-year period, with results determined largely by the companies’ relative exposure to the improvements in the oil price environment and by strategic choices made in response to the 2014 plunge in prices. The results for this period suggest that there is indeed scope for the supermajors to differentiate themselves in terms of TSR, provided they make the right capital allocation decisions.

The second defining feature of these companies’ TSR performance is the key role shareholder payouts have played, particularly as earnings have contracted. (See Exhibit 4.) Over the past ten years, the companies collectively spent an average of $56 billion annually on dividends and share buybacks. Royal Dutch Shell, Chevron, and ExxonMobil were particularly aggressive on the dividend front, increasing dividends by a combined 60%. The critical role of payouts in supporting TSRs is unlikely to diminish, particularly given the sustained challenges these companies face in achieving earnings growth.

The third defining feature is the importance of margin growth, which, like shareholder payouts, has provided key support to TSRs in the face of falling revenues. Companies have undertaken a range of portfolio moves to achieve this. Royal Dutch Shell, for example, boosted its FCF by consolidating a number of FCF-generating positions following the company’s acquisition of BG Group. Shell also undertook a large-scale divestiture program that removed less profitable assets from its portfolio.

Chevron, enquanto isso, aumentou o fluxo de caixa através do tão esperado comissionamento de sua Austrália Portfólio de Projeto Liquefeito de Gás Natural (LNG) e complementou isso com o aumento da disciplina de capital em outras partes do seu portfólio de projetos e forte compromisso com seu programa de crescimento de dividendos, que apoiou a expansão múltipla. A BP se beneficiou do forte crescimento das vendas, predominantemente por meio de aumentos de produção que surgiram das aquisições. A empresa também se beneficiou do forte desempenho de seus ativos a jusante e de seus esforços bem -sucedidos de redução de custos direcionados a suas participações a montante. Como o restante da indústria de petróleo e gás, os supermajoras geralmente estão descarregando seus ativos não -core para se concentrar nos ativos que consideram provavelmente gerar retornos e crescimento mais altos. Supermaijoras dos EUA somos particularmente otimistas na bacia do Permiano; A BP e a Royal Dutch Shell também estão se posicionando para se beneficiar da base considerável de recursos do Permiano. Crítico para o sucesso de cada uma dessas empresas será a capacidade de gerar melhores retornos a longo prazo e crescimento do lucro do que o menor E&S foi capaz de oferecer consistentemente com suas participações de recursos não convencionais. Gerando crescimento de vendas e melhorando as margens. Maximizar a eficiência operacional e o exercício de disciplina rigorosa de capital os ajudará a extrair cada dólar do que possui, expandirá o crescimento da margem ao máximo e se diferenciará ainda mais de seus pares. Vários jogadores da Europa, em particular, estão aumentando sua exposição-embora de uma pequena base-em renováveis, seus investimentos distribuídos ao longo do comprimento da cadeia de valor, incluindo posições em captura e armazenamento de carbono, geração solar e eólica, baterias e redes de carregamento de veículos elétricos. À medida que as operações aumentam, a capacidade desses investimentos de impulsionar o crescimento dos ganhos dos supermajors, moldar os múltiplos expectativas de ganhos e a avaliação e, acima de tudo, apoiar os pagamentos dos acionistas, será um diferenciador entre portfólios e TSRs.

Portfolio construction stands to be a major differentiator among these businesses as they attempt to position themselves optimally for future growth. Like the rest of the oil and gas industry, supermajors are generally offloading their noncore assets to focus on assets they deem likely to generate higher returns and growth. US supermajors are particularly bullish on the Permian Basin; BP and Royal Dutch Shell are also positioning themselves to benefit from the Permian’s sizable resource base. Critical to the success of each of these companies will be the ability to generate better long-term returns and profit growth than the smaller E&Ps have been able to consistently deliver with their holdings of unconventional resources.

A similar story will play out as the supermajors boost their investments in other asset types: the ability to pick the right assets—those with superior investment and cash-flow profiles—will matter and will be an important differentiator for generating sales growth and improving margins.

Beyond portfolio construction, the ways that supermajors manage their assets will be major factors in determining their business and ultimately TSR performance. Maximizing operational efficiencies and exercising rigorous capital discipline will help them squeeze every dollar from what they own, expand their margin growth to the fullest, and further differentiate themselves from their peers.

Emerging investments in new sources of energy also stand to be increasingly important. Several Europe-based players, in particular, are ramping up their exposure—albeit from a small base—to renewables, their investments distributed along the length of the value chain, including positions in carbon capture and storage, solar and wind generation, batteries, and electric-vehicle-charging networks. As operations scale up, the ability of these investments to drive supermajors’ earnings growth, shape earnings expectations and valuation multiples, and, above all, support shareholder payouts will be a differentiator among portfolios and TSRs.

Companhias nacionais de petróleo. A maioria dessas empresas se enquadra em duas categorias: Our study focused on a very precise set of NOCs: publicly listed companies with a free float of at least 20%, excluding many large NOCs. Most of these companies fell into two categories:

• Uma série de NOCs russos e alguns da América Latina, como a YPF da Argentina e o Petrobras do Brasil
• International resource seekers—NOCs with domestic resource bases that are either insufficient to cover domestic demand or are rapidly maturing—that compete internationally to extend their access to resources, including China’s CNOOC and CNPC, India’s ONGC, Norway’s Equinor (formerly Statoil), and Thailand’s PTT

Os NOCs incluídos em nosso estudo registraram TSRs fortes em relação a outros subsetores durante o período de três anos (o NOCS foi o subsector de melhor desempenho) e o período de cinco anos (NOCS foi o segundo melhor desempenho) e o período de cinco anos. Como empresas de outros subsetores de petróleo e gás, essas empresas responderam à queda nos preços das commodities, reduzindo as despesas operacionais e as despesas de capital. Uma diferença entre essas empresas e as de outros subsetores (por exemplo, supermajoras), no entanto, é que essas empresas foram mais rápidas em aumentar os gastos de capital nos últimos dois ou três anos. Isso reflete a forte ênfase das empresas em alcançar o crescimento no volume de produção e nos ganhos por meio de aquisições e, freqüentemente, expansão internacional. Os pagamentos dos acionistas e os múltiplos de avaliação - chaves de TSR para os Super -Majors - eram de importância secundária.

In our analysis of the TSR performance of the NOCs in our study, we found that profit growth was the single most significant driver over the five- and ten-year periods. This reflects the companies’ heavy emphasis on achieving growth in production volume and earnings through acquisitions and, frequently, international expansion. Shareholder payouts and valuation multiples—key drivers of TSR for the supermajors—were of secondary importance.

Another difference between NOCs and supermajors, in terms of driving TSR, is that listed NOCs’ balance sheets were smaller, leaving the companies more vulnerable to oil price volatility. (NOCs that used debt financing to fund international M&A were bottom-tier performers over both the three- and five-year periods.) There are, however, lessons NOCs could learn from the supermajors regarding, for example, the importance of optimized operations to TSR. Specifically, some NOCs will likely have to place increasing emphasis on operational efficiency as a means of driving margin expansion as their growth trajectories level off.

Midstream Companies. A newly added subsector in this year’s report comprises midstream companies, which provide processing, transportation, and storage of oil, natural gas, and natural gas liquids through pipelines and terminals. These businesses had generally strong TSR performance for the ten-year period, but the results of the five-year span were disappointing. The group’s three-year TSR results were mixed: some companies managed to produce strong results, but many companies continued to underperform. (See Exhibit 5)

Embora os TSRs de muitos jogadores nos três e cinco anos tenham sido decepcionantes, as empresas demonstraram um forte crescimento de receita durante esses períodos. Isso reflete a agressividade agressiva das empresas em resposta a mudanças na oferta e na demanda. As empresas com forte presença no fracionamento e liquefação a gás tiveram resultados relativamente fortes, especialmente nos últimos três anos. Essas empresas expandiram seus investimentos de capital a uma taxa constante nos últimos dez anos e finalmente estão começando a colher as recompensas. Seus lucros operacionais estão começando a subir no ano anterior ou dois à medida que mais de seus investimentos se tornam totalmente operacionais e estão sendo alavancados pelo upstream e

Midstream companies, especially those operating in North America, have experienced significant changes in the profitability of different parts of the value chain. Companies with a strong presence in fractionation and gas liquefaction have enjoyed relatively strong results, especially during the past three years. These companies expanded their capital investments at a steady rate over the past ten years and are finally starting to reap the rewards. Their operating profits are beginning to climb over the previous year or two as more of their investments become fully operational and are being leveraged by the upstream and setores a jusante .

Duas empresas deste subsetor valem a pena destacar. O Oneok, com sede em Oklahoma, foi um melhor desempenho em comparação com o amplo universo de petróleo e gás durante os períodos de três e dez anos. Ele alcançou sucesso por meio de diferentes táticas e estratégias. Nos últimos dez anos, aumentou seus dividendos tanto ou mais do que qualquer um de seus colegas. Nos últimos cinco anos, diminuiu sua dívida enquanto a maioria de seus colegas estava sofrendo de alavancagem adicional. Finalmente, a empresa construiu um portfólio de projetos cujo crescimento dos lucros nos últimos três anos excede a média do grupo. À medida que os EUA passaram de possivelmente importar GNL para exportá -lo, Cheniere conseguiu transformar o que foi a princípio um desafio potencialmente catastrófico para os negócios da empresa em uma grande oportunidade de crescimento em uma indústria crescente. Esse alto grau de adaptabilidade é uma das principais razões para o desempenho muito forte da TSR da empresa para o período de dez anos e seus resultados sólidos para o período de três anos em relação ao amplo setor de petróleo e gás. Confiança

Houston-based Cheniere Energy—a major US producer of LNG, which is relatively extraordinary compared with most midstream players—was a clear standout over the ten-year time frame and provides an example of how industry shifts can play a big part in deciding winners and losers. As the US shifted from possibly importing LNG to exporting it, Cheniere was able to turn what was at first a potentially catastrophic challenge to the company’s business into a major growth opportunity in a burgeoning industry. This high degree of adaptability is a major reason for the company’s very strong TSR performance for the ten-year period and its solid results for the three-year period relative to the broad oil and gas sector.

It should also be noted that ONEOK and Cheniere were among the leaders of the midstream subsector for the five-year period, a period of general underperformance by the group.

Rebuilding Investor Trust

Não há maneira rápida de reconstruir a confiança dos investidores no setor de petróleo e gás. A restauração da confiança é um processo de longo prazo dependente de empresas em todo o setor, entregue consistentemente contra metas diante de uma série de desafios de desenvolvimento e um ambiente de preço cíclico. O setor também precisará desenvolver novas narrativas para investidores e outras partes interessadas, narrativas que ajudam a proteger a licença social de longo prazo das empresas para operar. Os negócios, o investidor e as estratégias financeiros das empresas devem ser alinhados e orientados a objetivos comuns para garantir a máxima transparência e responsabilidade. Os melhores desempenhos manterão os pontos de vista treinados na manutenção da disciplina de capital, maximizando a FCF, gerenciando diligentemente o portfólio, adotando agressivamente as tecnologias digitais, avaliando adequadamente o desempenho da TSR, garantindo o mix de investidores corretos e determinando o equilíbrio ideal entre dividendos e recompensas nos pagamentos dos acionistas.

Regaining shareholders’ trust, though, starts with companies delivering on the levers most critical to industry TSR: earnings growth, multiple expansion, and shareholder payouts. Companies’ business, investor, and financial strategies should be aligned and oriented toward common goals to ensure maximum transparency and accountability. Top performers will keep their sights trained on maintaining capital discipline, maximizing FCF, diligently managing the portfolio, aggressively embracing digital technologies, appropriately benchmarking TSR performance, ensuring the right investor mix, and determining the optimal balance between dividends and buybacks in shareholder payouts.

Mantendo a disciplina de capital. A disciplina de capital será essencial para manter pagamentos atraentes aos investidores. Vários supermaijoras se comprometeram a aumentar os pagamentos materialmente na década de 2020; Para eles, especialmente, a manutenção da disciplina de capital será vital, exceto um aumento significativo nos preços do petróleo. A disciplina de capital também sustenta outras variáveis ​​- incluindo as classificações de crédito e o retorno do capital empregado - que apóiam os múltiplos dos supermaijores. Para essas empresas, uma contrataz rígida no uso do capital é uma obrigação. Oil and gas companies will need to demonstrate capital discipline across oil price cycles in order to restore investors’ confidence in management and the industry’s reputation as a responsible steward of investor capital. Capital discipline will be essential to maintaining attractive payouts to investors. Several supermajors have pledged to boost payouts materially in the 2020s; for them, especially, maintaining capital discipline will be vital, barring a significant increase in oil prices. Capital discipline also underpins other variables—including credit ratings and return on capital employed—that support supermajors’ multiples. For these businesses, a tight rein on their use of capital is a must.

Maximizando o fluxo de caixa livre. Para atender às expectativas dos investidores, as empresas precisarão escolher seus investimentos com sabedoria. E eles devem estar preparados para descartar investimentos que ficam aquém dos alvos. Investors view oil and gas companies’ ability to generate satisfactory levels of FCF as a critical investment screen, even in an environment of lower oil prices. To meet investors’ expectations, companies will need to pick their investments wisely. And they must be prepared to jettison investments that fall short of targets.

Investors are placing particular demands on upstream empresas. Os Super -Majors estão sendo recompensados ​​por portfólios com características específicas - por exemplo, ênfase em ativos ou regiões específicas. Eles devem estar conscientes e capazes de explicar como diferentes participações e posições individuais em vários segmentos de negócios se saem em termos de atingir as metas de FCF e TSR. Os jogadores de E&P enfrentam um conjunto específico de desafios comerciais e, portanto, as expectativas dos investidores. Os investidores estarão buscando planos de negócios totalmente financiados, bem como a capacidade de gerar crescimento através da FCF existente. Mas as empresas ainda precisarão mostrar como esses investimentos se encaixam em sua proposta de valor geral. Uma maneira de fazer isso pode ser posicionar esses investimentos como fluxos de fluxo de caixa de baixo risco e de anuidade que equilibram as partes de alto risco do portfólio. Outra maneira pode ser, por exemplo, posicionar investimentos a jusante - como investimentos em biocombustível - como investimentos que oferecem valor incremental das atividades principais das empresas. As fusões e aquisições serão uma ferramenta importante para explorar para acumular os ativos certos. Pode valer a pena considerar no ambiente de hoje, quando muitas contrapartes em potencial procuram eliminar ativos não -core por meio de desinvestimento. As avaliações em alguns subsectores - principalmente E&P - também são baixas, criando o que é efetivamente o mercado de um comprador. (Embora a atividade de fusões e aquisições na E&P tenha se recuperado de uma baixa de dez anos em 2016, quando havia US $ 118 bilhões em acordos, ela permanece abaixo dos níveis de pré-crise.)

In the initial stages of investment, investors will likely hold companies’ investments in alternate sources of energy to lower standards with regard to FCF generation. But companies will still need to be able to show how such investments fit into their overall value proposition. One way to do this could be to position these investments as low-risk, annuity-like cash flow streams that balance the high-risk parts of the portfolio. Another way could be, for example, to position downstream investments—such as investments in biofuel—as investments that deliver incremental value from the companies’ core activities.

Diligently Managing the Portfolio. Tight portfolio management will be necessary for maximizing returns and ensuring portfolio longevity. M&A will be an important tool to exploit for amassing the right assets. It could be especially worthwhile to consider in today’s environment, when many potential counterparties are looking to shed noncore assets through divestment. Valuations in some subsectors—notably E&P—are also low, creating what is effectively a buyer’s market. (Although M&A activity in E&P has rebounded from a ten-year low in 2016, when there was $118 billion in deals, it remains below precrisis levels.)

As empresas devem observar, no entanto, que o mercado de fusões e aquisições está atualmente em equilíbrio. Além disso, os investidores não recompensaram consistentemente empresas de aquisição ultimamente. Testemunha, por exemplo, o slide no preço das ações da Occidental Petroleum após a aquisição da empresa de Anadarko, em comparação com o aumento do preço das ações da Chevron quando a empresa se afastou de sua compra contemplada dessa empresa. Mas eles devem ter certeza de que quaisquer movimentos contemplados realmente criarão valor. Existem poucos ajustes perfeitos.

Assuming, however, that valuations in certain segments remain relatively low in the medium term, large companies will likely return aggressively to the M&A arena. But they must be certain that any contemplated moves will indeed create value. There are few perfect fits.

Abraçando agressivamente as tecnologias digitais. As ferramentas digitais podem, por exemplo, permitir reduções significativas na manutenção e outros custos operacionais. De fato, a concorrência do setor praticamente exige isso: desde a desaceleração, as empresas coletivamente fizeram avanços materiais na redução das despesas operacionais em toda a cadeia de valor. Por exemplo, o pessoal necessário para produzir um barril de petróleo nos EUA foi reduzido em 60%. Esse zelo e proezas de corte de custos provavelmente continuarão. As ferramentas digitais também ajudam a garantir que os cortes de custos sejam duradouros. Alguns cortes relacionados à E & P-incluindo, por exemplo, reduções na injeção química, manutenção e propostas de poço-podem proporcionar economias significativas. Mas apenas uma vez. A espremer parceiros de serviços de campo petrolífero para reduções de taxa pode produzir efeitos finitos semelhantes. Muitas economias orientadas digitalmente são, por outro lado, sustentáveis. Early adoption and skillful use of digital technologies now and later, when these technologies stand to be increasingly important differentiators, can help oil and gas companies on a number of fronts. Digital tools can, for instance, enable meaningful reductions in maintenance and other operating costs. Indeed, industry competition practically demands this: since the downturn, companies collectively have made material strides in reducing operational expenditures across the value chain. For example, personnel needed to produce a barrel of oil in the US has been reduced by 60%. This cost-cutting zeal and prowess will likely continue. Digital tools also help ensure that the cost cuts are lasting. Some E&P-related cuts—including, for example, reductions in chemical injection, maintenance, and well tenders—can deliver meaningful savings. But only once. Squeezing oilfield services partners for rate reductions can yield similar, finite effects. Many digitally driven savings are, in contrast, sustainable.

Cada vez mais, o objetivo das tecnologias digitais é impulsionar o crescimento de primeira linha, ajudando as empresas a fortalecer e expandir seus principais negócios, desenvolver novos mercados, criar novos negócios e se tornar mais centrados no cliente. Os jogadores de E&P, por exemplo, estão usando essas tecnologias para executar suas tarefas principais com mais eficiência. Os varejistas de combustível estão usando-os para criar novas capacidades de negociação e empresas focadas em mobilidade e cliente. Em vez disso, eles devem se comparar com um universo mais amplo de empresas, incluindo o mercado geral e, em alguns casos, de alto desempenho de outros setores. Os recursos da EOG, por exemplo, referem-se a um universo das empresas S&P 500, em vez de um conjunto de pares específico do setor. Outros jogadores de petróleo e gás devem seguir sua liderança. Isso é fundamental para os jogadores de petróleo e gás, especialmente no ambiente atual. Uma tendência específica que vale a pena notar: a base de investidores para a maioria dos subsectores de petróleo e gás mudou e continua a mudar, da busca do crescimento. Supermains, por exemplo, viu aproximadamente 10% de sua mudança de base de investidores de uma orientação para o crescimento para uma orientação focada em valor ou renda na última década. (Existem exceções a esta regra. Os subsectores de E&P de renda pura e média norte-americanos mantiveram suas ações constantes de investidores orientados para o crescimento. Aproximadamente 60% dos investidores do Subsetor de E&P da América do Norte, por exemplo, o foco e o crescimento e o crescimento e o crescimento e o crescimento dos investidores e dos investidores.) | A renda - é consistente com suas estratégias e capacidades. Isso é fundamental para os jogadores de petróleo e gás, especialmente no ambiente atual.

Appropriately Benchmarking TSR Performance. Given the sector’s broad underperformance on the TSR front, oil and gas companies should not content themselves with comparisons against the already-depressed results of their peers. Rather, they should compare themselves with a broader universe of companies, including the overall market and, in some cases, high performers from other sectors. EOG Resources, for example, benchmarks itself against the universe of S&P 500 companies rather than a sector-specific set of peers. Other oil and gas players should follow its lead.

Ensuring the Right Investor Mix. Each company must make sure that it has investors whose focus and goals—for example, value, growth, or growth and income—are consistent with its strategies and capabilities. This is critical for oil and gas players, especially in the current environment. One particular trend worth noting: the investor base for most oil and gas subsectors has shifted, and continues to shift, from the pursuit of growth. Supermajors, for example, saw roughly 10% of their investor base shift from a growth orientation to a value- or income-focused orientation over the past decade. (There are exceptions to this rule. The midstream and North American pure-play E&P subsectors have maintained their steady shares of growth-oriented investors. Roughly 60% of the North American pure-play E&P subsector’s base, for example, remains “growth” or “growth at a reasonable price” investors.)

Cada um desses tipos de investidores tem suas próprias preferências em relação ao tamanho, estilo de gerenciamento e outros atributos de empresas que representam investimentos em potencial. As empresas de petróleo e gás devem identificar qual desses tipos é sua base de investidores "naturais" e fornecer um argumento claro e convincente que pode atrair e conquistar os investidores que desejam. As mensagens precisas e transparentes são essenciais para estabelecer e manter a confiança. Se a gerência é otimista em novos mercados, por exemplo, não deve atrair investidores de renda que procuram principalmente pagamentos de dividendos e um programa de gasto de capital estreitamente focado. Em termos práticos, isso significa encontrar maneiras de tornar seus negócios mais verdes e, simultaneamente, melhorando ainda mais a transparência do impacto ambiental de suas operações. As respectivas estratégias enviarão aos investidores. Os dividendos, por exemplo, podem sinalizar um compromisso de longo prazo em devolver dinheiro aos acionistas, enquanto as recompras de ações são frequentemente consideradas eventos únicos. Os dividendos também podem sugerir que a gerência está confiante na sustentabilidade e na qualidade dos ganhos futuros, enquanto as recompras podem enviar uma mensagem tão clara. No equilíbrio, os efeitos no múltiplo P/E de aumentos significativos e sustentados em dividendos são tipicamente muito maiores do que os anúncios de grandes recompras de ações. Em uma era de desafios comerciais sem precedentes que incluem a necessidade de atingir novos relacionamentos com governos, ONGs, grupos ambientais, funcionários e outras partes interessadas.

All oil and gas companies must also make the necessary adjustments to address the concerns of ESG investors, whose influence on the sector’s share prices stands to become increasingly powerful. In practical terms, this means finding ways to make their businesses greener and, simultaneously, further enhancing the transparency of their operations’ environmental impact.

Determining the Optimal Balance Between Dividends and Buybacks in Shareholder Payouts. If the decision is made to return money to shareholders, the company should consider the merits of dividends versus buybacks, especially with regard to the signals the respective strategies will send to investors. Dividends, for example, can signal a long-term commitment to returning cash to shareholders, while share buybacks are often regarded as one-time events. Dividends can also suggest that management is confident in the sustainability and quality of future earnings, while buybacks may send no such clear message. On balance, the effects on the P/E multiple of significant, sustained increases in dividends are typically much larger than the announcements of large share buybacks.

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The oil and gas industry—an obviously critical factor in the world’s ability to meet its current and future energy needs, as well as a major player in the global financial system (dividend payouts by the supermajors, specifically, are among the largest by any businesses)—finds itself in an era of unprecedented business challenges that include the need to strike new relationships with governments, NGOs, environmental groups, employees, and other stakeholders. No entanto, o setor não deve perder sua relação fundamental com os investidores. Essa relação está danificada, mas pode e deve ser reparada. Embora a quantidade de esforço necessária seja considerável, o caminho para chegar lá é claro - e a vantagem é enorme. Diretor, Centro de Impacto Energético