quatro futuros para o sistema alimentar global

Como seria o sistema alimentar global em 5, 10 ou 15 anos? Vários futuros são imagináveis. Talvez a África tenha alcançado muito mais soberania alimentar. O protecionismo pode fazer com que os preços dos alimentos subam drasticamente. Alguns países globais do norte podem dominar o comércio agrícola, deslocando os pequenos agricultores em outros lugares. Ou - apenas talvez - o mundo possa se unir, colaborando para diminuir as mudanças climáticas, aumentar o comércio agrícola global e aliviar a fome entre as populações mais vulneráveis ​​do mundo. Ninguém pode prever com precisão com precisão como as mudanças climáticas afetarão a produção global de alimentos. Isso ocorre porque as mudanças climáticas e outros fatores-como conflito geopolítico, alto carga de dívida entre países de baixa e média renda (LMICs) e grandes avanços nas tecnologias agrícolas-que afetarão o sistema alimentar ao longo do tempo, é profundamente interconectado e está sujeito a níveis muito altos de hidratórios. Sistema alimentar global frágil para o ponto de ruptura. Antes da guerra, uma combinação sombria de distribuição desigual de alimentos, aumento do protecionismo, enormes quantidades de desperdício e perda de alimentos e excesso de dependência em algumas culturas levaram a desnutrição maciça e fome total. Mais recentemente, as exportações de trigo ucraniano e russo, fertilizantes e outros produtos importantes desapareceram dos mercados em todo o mundo. Como descrevemos em

It is, of course, impossible to know exactly what the future holds in store. No one can accurately forecast precisely how climate change will affect global food production. That’s because climate change and other factors—such as geopolitical conflict, high debt burden among low- and medium-income countries (LMICs), and major advances in agricultural technologies—that will affect the food system over time are deeply interconnected and subject to very high levels of uncertainty.

Unquestionably, the combined impact of COVID-19 and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has stressed an already fragile global food system to the breaking point. Prior to the war, a grim combination of inequitable food distribution, increasing protectionism, enormous amounts of food waste and loss, and overdependence on a few crops had led to massive malnutrition and outright hunger. More recently, exports of Ukrainian and Russian wheat, fertilizer, and other key products have disappeared from markets worldwide. As we described in Um artigo recente Os efeitos dessa mudança foram terríveis: os preços que crescem rapidamente para os alimentos necessários agora e para os insumos e combustíveis necessários para produzir e mover os alimentos que o mundo precisará amanhã. Os esforços concertados para aliviar a atual crise alimentar e estabilizar o sistema alimentar terão sucesso? Ou eles deixarão de fornecer alimentos suficientes e os meios para cultivá -los de maneira equitativa e economicamente? Os quase US $ 700 bilhões em subsídios anuais dedicados a apoiar o sistema alimentar farão a diferença na próxima década?

As efforts to relieve the immediate impact of the food crisis continue, stakeholders—including governments, multilaterals, NGOs, and the private sector—must also look to the future. Will concerted efforts to relieve the current food crisis and stabilize the food system succeed? Or will they fail to provide sufficient food and the means to grow it equitably and economically? Will the almost $700 billion in annual subsidies dedicated to supporting the food system make a difference in the next decade?

Este artigo apresenta quatro cenários para o futuro. Esses cenários não são previsões. Em vez disso, eles representam nossos melhores esforços para visualizar os contornos de um mundo esticado, mas plausível, no qual poderíamos operar-ou várias versões desse mundo-dependendo de certos fatores-chave e suas incertezas subjacentes. Nossa esperança é que o exame desses cenários promova uma consideração atenciosa sobre como o sistema alimentar global pode parecer em 5 a 15 anos, forneça a base para as partes interessadas se prepararem para uma ampla gama de contingências mais recentes e incentivadas de que os stakeholders. A invasão da Ucrânia pela Rússia é a causa imediata da atual crise alimentar, pelo menos três outros fatores foram fundamentais para exacerbá -la. O Covid-19 pandêmico interrompeu as cadeias de suprimentos globais e os sistemas alimentares, aumentando drasticamente os preços dos alimentos e deixando até 1,6 bilhão de pessoas-um quarto da população mundial-sem acesso a alimentos adequados. A pandemia também exacerbou a carga maciça de dívidas suportadas pelos LMICs, pois direcionavam fundos escassos para defender suas populações contra a doença, dificultando a compensação de alimentos, fertilizantes e custos de combustível. E, finalmente, os efeitos das mudanças climáticas estão tendo um impacto deletério significativo nos rendimentos agrícolas.

The Status Quo

Although Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is the immediate cause of the current food crisis, at least three other factors have been instrumental in exacerbating it. The COVID-19 pandemic disrupted global supply chains and food systems, dramatically increasing food prices and leaving up to 1.6 billion people—one-fourth of the world’s population—without access to adequate food. The pandemic also exacerbated the massive debt burden borne by LMICs, as they directed scarce funds toward defending their populations against the disease, making it more difficult for them to offset fast-rising food, fertilizer, and fuel costs. And finally, the effects of climate change are having a significant deleterious impact on farming yields.

As mudanças climáticas já tiveram impactos devastadores na agricultura global. A degradação da terra reduziu a produtividade de 23% das terras agrícolas do mundo (especialmente na África e no Sul da Ásia) e até US $ 577 bilhões em produção agrícola anual estão em risco com a perda de polinizadores. À medida que o mundo se aproxima do limiar de aumento da temperatura de 1,5 ° C, o setor agrícola está absorvendo cerca de 25% do dano total e perdas de desastres relacionados ao clima. No debate emergente sobre os pagamentos de países historicamente emissores, até mercados emergentes por perdas e danos causados ​​pelas mudanças climáticas, o sistema alimentar começou a se apresentar com destaque. A agricultura global produz alimentos suficientes para alimentar o mundo, mas até 30% dos alimentos produzidos são perdidos ou desperdiçados, mesmo quando os aumentos nos rendimentos da colheita estão desacelerando. E um aumento nas guerras de protecionismo e comércio limitou a distribuição equitativa dos alimentos disponíveis e fez com que os preços globais dos alimentos aumentassem. Esse nível de concentração aumenta a exposição do sistema aos efeitos catastróficos de eventos adversos repentinos. Enquanto isso, em nível global, os pequenos agricultores-uma grande proporção das quais são mulheres-produzem a maior parte da comida do mundo, mas recebem uma média de apenas 4% do preço final dos alimentos como pagamento por seu trabalho. Demonstra. Como cada um desses fatores ocorre - e como eles afetam o norte global e o sul global - está sujeito a altos níveis de incerteza. Quatro variáveis ​​principais governarão esse fator: produção e comércio, as características de várias cadeias de suprimentos agrícolas, novas tecnologias e inovação e mudanças na demanda e consumo de alimentos. Será determinado não apenas pelos efeitos da atividade natural e humana na terra, oceano, atmosfera e eventos climáticos, mas também pela natureza e extensão das políticas, estratégias e inovações tecnológicas projetadas para abordar esses efeitos - e pela disposição do mundo em agir. Esses impactos são ainda mais difíceis de prever, à medida que olhamos além dos próximos 15 anos. Geopolítica - incluindo o resultado da guerra na Ucrânia, o surgimento de outros conflitos, a mudança de dinâmica do poder entre países e regiões e a ascensão do nacionalismo - também desempenharão um papel significativo. E a possibilidade e os impactos potenciais de futuras pandemias só podem ser adivinhados. Sob tais condições, os cenários são uma maneira especialmente útil de refletir sobre diferentes estados futuros esticados, mas plausíveis, que podem enfrentar as partes interessadas no sistema alimentar global e desenvolver respostas apropriadas a elas. Consideração cuidadosa de como os vários fatores -chave observados acima podem acontecer. Por mais valioso que os cenários possam estar em esforço para imaginar como pode ser o futuro, seu valor central está em sua capacidade de desencadear o pensamento sobre as implicações estratégicas de cada uma, bem como sobre planos e ações potenciais necessárias à medida que os futuros se desenrolam, independentemente da forma que ele toma.

Yet these impacts have only further exposed the inherent fragility of the global food system. Global agriculture produces enough food to feed the world, but as much as 30% of the food produced is lost or wasted, even as increases in crop yields are slowing. And a rise in protectionism and trade wars has limited the equitable distribution of available food and caused global food prices to rise.

Moreover, the global food system depends heavily on just a few crops and offers limited support for diverse, nutritious diets. This level of concentration increases the system’s exposure to the catastrophic effects of sudden adverse events. Meanwhile, at a global level, smallholder farmers—a large proportion of whom are women—produce most of the world’s food but receive an average of just 4% of the final price of food as payment for their work.

In short, our global food systems severely lack resilience and are highly vulnerable to external shocks, as the crisis brought on by COVID-19, climate change, and the war in Ukraine all too clearly demonstrates.

Factors and Uncertainties

In generating our scenarios, we focused on three overarching factors that are sure to impact global food systems over the next five years: the state of the world’s agriculture, climate change, and global economic and geopolitical dynamics. How each of these factors plays out—and how they affect the Global North and the Global South—is subject to high levels of uncertainty.

The state of the world’s agriculture will largely determine the kinds of food required and the capacity of global food systems to grow and distribute enough to feed the world. Four key variables will govern this factor: production and trade, the characteristics of various agricultural supply chains, new technology and innovation, and shifts in food demand and consumption.

The impact of climate change on global agriculture over the next five years is highly uncertain. It will be determined not just by the effects of natural and human activity on land, ocean, atmosphere, and weather events but also by the nature and extent of the policies, strategies, and technological innovations designed to address those effects—and by world’s willingness to act. These impacts are even more difficult to forecast as we look beyond the next 15 years.

Global economic and geopolitical dynamics include a range of uncertainties, including the level of country debt following the COVID-19 pandemic and future capital market flows, borrowing capacity, credit ratings, prices, inflation, and economic growth. Geopolitics—including the outcome of the war in Ukraine, the emergence of other conflicts, changing power dynamics among countries and regions, and the rise of nationalism—will also play a significant role. And the possibility and potential impacts of future pandemics can only be guessed at.

Four Scenarios

All of these uncertainties are evolving in parallel, creating a highly complex environment that renders attempts to sort out a probable future essentially impossible. Under such conditions, scenarios are an especially useful way to ponder different stretched-but-plausible future states that may face stakeholders in the global food system and to develop appropriate responses to them.

Each of the scenarios discussed below—which we call “Uneven Progress,” “The Rise of Africa,” “Every Country for Itself,” and “Coordinated Step Forward”—offers a distinct vision of the middle-term future, developed through careful consideration of how the various key factors noted above might play out. As valuable as the scenarios may be in efforts to imagine what the future might look like, their core value lies in their capacity to trigger thinking about the strategic implications of each one, as well as about plans and potential actions needed as the future unfolds, regardless of what form it ultimately takes.

Embora eventos futuros não correspondam exatamente a nenhum dos cenários, cada cenário envolve repercussões estratégicas para os três grupos de partes interessadas-governos, organizações multilaterais e do setor social e as empresas do setor privado-que têm as principais apostas. (Consulte a exposição.)

Scenario 1: Uneven Progress

Global coordination stalls, but a few breakout nations among high-income countries (HICs) in the Global North lead a policy-driven development agenda and promote the uptake of existing climate-smart technologies. Meanwhile, inequity worsens as extreme weather decimates the Global South, food availability declines, and prices increase unevenly across the world.

In this scenario, global supply chains become concentrated and dominated by countries such as Canada and the Nordics that build on their low-carbon exports. Agricultural technology remains focused on industrial and contract farming, displacing smallholder farmers around the world. The Global South suffers in the face of ongoing high debt, as the world—and especially Europe—prepares for increased numbers of climate refugees.

This scenario has a number of strategic implications:

• Private sector companies that adapt nimbly to the breakout countries’ regulatory agenda will reap benefits, while their slower-moving rivals lose market position. If climate-focused countries begin to dominate the global agenda, companies that invest in decarbonizing their supply chains and developing climate-resilient agricultural inputs and healthier processed foods are likely to benefit the most. Nurturing strong relationships with key governments could help promote joint investments toward a more resilient food system.
• Multilateral organizations hoping to persuade countries around the world to act in unison on climate and food goals will meet resistance, but social sector organizations could gain considerable backing from breakout countries in support of their own climate and food security agendas. Doubling down on climate mitigation and food system resilience efforts could reduce some negative impacts. For example, multilaterals could push for national climate adaptation strategies and encourage bilateral creditors, including the private sector, to restructure debt for debt-distressed countries.
• Governments in breakout countries will benefit generally from favorable agricultural yields and from the shift of power in their favor, resulting in considerably higher-than-average GDP growth. But most LMICs—especially those in climate-vulnerable geographies—will face greater internal inequality. To weather the impacts of this scenario, LMIC governments should invest in duty-free protocols through regional trading blocs, including strengthening food and fertilizer import facilities and developing integrated decision support systems across data sets and government ministries to tackle climate uncertainties.

Scenario 2: The Rise of Africa

In this scenario, Africa accelerates its agriculture potential through unprecedented South-South cooperation, technology transfers, and private sector investments, especially from countries such as India and China. Overall, food availability and productivity increase, prices drop, and hunger declines, but the benefits are not distributed evenly across the continent. Moreover, intensified agriculture leads to backsliding on climate goals.

This scenario imagines a world in which reduced global trade results in more powerful regional trading blocs. Shorter food staple supply chains lead to intensified agriculture, notably in Africa, thanks in part to rapid adoption of technological advances in climate-smart agricultural inputs. At the same time, however, increased protein consumption on the continent and a lack of international consensus on climate policy cause greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to increase there and elsewhere.

The strategic implications of this scenario are as follows:

• Private sector companies that have strong commercial investments in Africa (specifically in climate-smart technologies that can boost production of local crops and encourage regenerative farming techniques) will be well-positioned under these conditions to boost production and take advantage of untapped agricultural capacity. Given the potential for disruptions in global trade, companies that shore up their supply chains will also prosper.
• Organizações multilaterais provavelmente poderão trabalhar com sucesso com os governos HIC e LMIC para garantir um crescimento equitativo e o papel das ONGs do setor social - especialmente aqueles com presença de base - em prestação de assistência técnica provavelmente expandirá. Tanto a multilateral quanto as ONGs desempenharão papéis críticos na coordenação de parcerias do setor público-privado para aumentar a produção de clima smart, fornecendo assistência oficial ao desenvolvimento e suporte técnico para reduzir a dívida na África e apoiar melhor o valor de um valor em que a BERA. Mas aqueles com altos níveis de dívida podem ser forçados a confiar na extração de recursos, expondo ainda mais as geografias mais vulneráveis ​​ao clima aos impactos das mudanças climáticas. Em geral, os governos africanos que estabelecem incentivos claros para a agricultura e investimentos climáticos em infraestrutura local, como instalações de armazenamento, surgirão no topo. Por necessidade, alimentos alternativos como o milho substituem as commodities globais. No entanto, a ação climática limitada leva a um ponto sem retorno. Os países ricos em recursos se beneficiam; Outros sofrem.
• Governments in Africa that can maintain strong governance and low levels of debt will be better positioned to drive equitable growth within their borders. But those with high levels of debt may be forced to rely on resource extraction, further exposing those in the most climate-vulnerable geographies to the impacts of climate change. In general, African governments that establish clear incentives for climate-smart agriculture and investments in local infrastructure such as storage facilities will emerge on top.

Scenario 3: Every Country for Itself

A self-sufficiency narrative takes root globally, leading to significant reductions in global agricultural trade. By necessity, alternative foods such as millet replace global commodities. However, limited climate action leads to a point of no return. Resource-rich countries benefit; others suffer.

Nesse cenário, um aumento significativo no protecionismo tem efeitos negativos de amplo alcance. Os custos alimentares aumentam e a disponibilidade diminui à medida que o comércio global entra em 20%. As cadeias de suprimentos são interrompidas e os lucros no declínio agrícola do setor privado. A falha em conter o aquecimento global leva a eventos climáticos extremos e reduções adicionais nos rendimentos agrícolas. Os países correm para proteger suas populações, mas a desigualdade e a agitação social aumentam. As empresas do setor privado que adotam mais abordagens “glocais” para o fornecimento, a obtenção e o acesso aos recursos poderão colher os benefícios das oportunidades locais, limitando sua dependência de redes globais. Isso fortalecerá sua capacidade de compensar os desafios decorrentes da quebra do comércio e das cadeias de suprimentos globais e de atender à demanda do consumidor dentro de suas fronteiras. As multinacionais podem achar benéfico divulgar unidades de negócios locais em algumas circunstâncias. Para compensar o declínio da cooperação internacional, os multilaterais podem precisar incentivar os governos dos doadores a adotar um grande recomendamento a objetivos de ajuda e investimento - incluindo programas de ajuda à dívida para os pequenos agricultores - e iniciar um diálogo para o perdão bilateral da dívida e uma reestruturação fundamental de instrumentos monetários. Por sua parte, as ONGs que podem neutralizar a resistência à cooperação através da presença profunda e no país podem estar melhor situadas para identificar e cultivar parcerias locais importantes para superar esses desafios. A ação governamental será fundamental para reduzir o risco de volatilidade dos preços dos alimentos e o potencial resultante da agitação. Os governos LMIC serão mais resilientes nesse cenário se investirem no fortalecimento das reservas estratégicas de grãos e commodities alternativas por meio de cadeias de valor local e na melhoria da infraestrutura local. ganha impulso. Isso promove a adoção de inovações existentes ao clima. O setor privado é pressionado a acompanhar, especialmente beneficiando as empresas que fizeram apostas estratégicas precoces em empreendimentos verdes. O comércio global aumenta, e as cadeias de suprimentos se tornam mais resilientes e transparentes, reduzindo significativamente o desperdício e a perda de alimentos. A demanda muda para alimentos mais nutritivos e ambientalmente conscientes, como proteínas à base de plantas. Um consenso global surge sobre a desaceleração do aquecimento global, levando a investimentos em práticas agrícolas amigas e humanas, incluindo melhor proteção de terras aráveis ​​e emissões de GEE diminuídas.

We see a number of strategic implications under these conditions:

• Private sector companies with global reach will face major challenges as trade and supply chains break down and volatility increases, while companies with strong localized presences will come to dominate their markets. Private sector companies that adopt more “glocal” approaches to sourcing, procuring, and accessing resources will be able to reap the benefits of local opportunities while limiting their reliance on global networks. This will strengthen their ability to offset the challenges arising from the breakdown of trade and global supply chains, and to meet consumer demand within their borders. Multinationals may find it beneficial to spin off local business units in some circumstances.
• Multilateral organizations will likely be severely hampered by the lack of global cooperation and by limited funding, and organizations in the social sector will struggle to scale their operating models across disconnected, uncooperative countries. To offset the decline in international cooperation, multilaterals may need to encourage donor governments to embrace a massive recommitment to aid and investment goals—including debt relief programs for smallholder farmers—and to initiate a dialogue for bilateral debt forgiveness and a fundamental restructuring of monetary instruments. For their part, NGOs that can counteract resistance to cooperation through deep, in-country presence may be better situated to identify and cultivate key local partnerships to overcome these challenges.
• Governments in countries that are well-endowed with resources will thrive as global trade dwindles, but the negative impacts of climate change will accelerate in countries most exposed to global warming. Governmental action will be critical in reducing the risk of food price volatility and the resulting potential for unrest. LMIC governments will be more resilient in this scenario if they invest in strengthening strategic grain reserves and alternative commodities through local value chains and in improving local infrastructure.

Scenario 4: Coordinated Step Forward

Spurred by a food system disaster exacerbated by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, greater global coordination in climate policy and agriculture gains momentum. This promotes adoption of existing climate-friendly innovations. The private sector is pressured to follow along, especially benefitting companies that made early strategic bets on green ventures.

In this future, collective action yields to numerous benefits. Global trade rises, and supply chains grow more resilient and transparent, significantly reducing food waste and loss. Demand shifts toward more nutritious, environmentally conscious foods such as plant-based proteins. A global consensus emerges on slowing global warming, leading to investment in climate-friendly and humane agricultural practices, including better protection of arable land and decreased GHG emissions.

Este cenário tem as seguintes implicações estratégicas:

• Empresas do setor privado that lead in helping mitigate global warming will outperform their slower-moving, slow-to-innovate peers in a world where cooperation is essential. As the private sector faces increasing regulatory and consumer pressures to act more transparently and sustainably, companies that have simplified and shortened their supply chains for staple crops, invested in alternative nutritious grains to create triple bottom line impact—social, environmental, and economic—and scaled up techniques for sustainable sourcing and food and packaging waste reduction will reap the benefits. These companies can balance the desire for near-term profits with consideration of the market potential and resulting long-term business gains in LMICs.
• Multilateral and social sector organizations will be able to significantly expand funding and programs that target food security and climate goals through collective action. They may also push for climate finance commitments focused on adapting to the impacts of global warming and increasing development aid to support climate adaptation and mitigation.
• Governments in countries with strong climate regulations will dominate the global stage, while those in countries more vulnerable to global warming will mitigate negative impacts through collective action. In this scenario, LMIC governments that have already begun creating demand for a range of diverse crops via subsidies, minimum price supports, and public procurement will be better positioned to achieve food sovereignty—as will HIC governments that have clearly defined the policies and actions necessary to facilitate the transition to a green economy, including more aggressive targets for emissions reductions and carbon neutrality.

No-Regret Moves

As important as it is for stakeholders in the public, private, and social sectors to prepare for the wide range of potential contingencies indicated by the four scenarios, it is even more critical for them to begin taking actions that are likely to pay off under any circumstances, with little or no foreseeable downside. These include various activities broadly designed to reduce the impact of future food crises, mitigate global warming, promote global trade, increase global equity, and improve supply chain resilience.

Private Sector. Companies in the private sector companies need to pursue a robust Global North and Global South engagement strategy. Food companies should invest in technologies and delivery models that prioritize climate-smart production of staples and nonstaples, such as disease- and drought-resistant seeds. By diversifying their sourcing strategies and value chains, and reducing food waste, they can help stabilize food prices and protect against future shocks. All companies will benefit from strategies to reduce emissions and invest in green technologies (including energy transition plans) and circularity. They should also work to reduce the productivity gap in the Global South by promoting technology transfers. A better balance between boosting near-term profits and capturing the Global South's market potential will likely mean long-term business gains.

Social Sector. Multilaterals and NGOs must double down on humanitarian assistance to the world’s most vulnerable populations and advocate for and support negotiations to pursue national climate adaptation strategies. To that end, they should urge donor countries to recommit to climate goals in agriculture, including providing increased development assistance to LMICs to support their efforts to mitigate the causes of climate change and adapt to its effects.

Multilaterals should also advocate for restructuring LMIC debt to increase capital flows, including debt relief programs for smallholder farmers, and they should establish alliances among governments, NGOs, and private sector companies to boost food production. Finally, they should promote a sustainable and just energy transition to the benefit of all, including efforts to develop and improve biofuels to avoid competition with food and to use nonfossil fuels for electrification.

Public Sector. HIC donor governments should increase their climate-related development assistance, with the goal of reaching equality targets based on the Gini index of global wealth distribution. For their part, LMIC governments—especially those in Africa and South Asia—need to rethink their food and climate policies and incentives, committing to actions such as industry tax exemptions, time-bound subsidies, minimum selling prices, and strategic grain reserves. Greater investment in integrated climate analytics will help countries monitor and support decision making during agricultural and food crises. And the development of duty-free protocols through regional trading blocs, combined with strengthened import facilities for food and fertilizer, would promote trade in agricultural inputs and products where they are most needed.

Equitabilidade, sustentabilidade, resiliência

Nosso frágil sistema alimentar global já estava esticado até o ponto de ruptura. Mas os duplos golpes da pandemia covid-19 e a guerra na Ucrânia estão agora fazendo com que ela se encaixe em vários lugares. Sua falta de resiliência gerou graves choques que causaram estragos globalmente sobre a acessibilidade e acessibilidade de alimentos de alta qualidade. O objetivo deste exercício foi imaginar vários futuros possíveis decorrentes diretamente do estado atual do sistema, com o objetivo de desencadear ações por parte de todas as partes interessadas para provocar um sistema alimentar mais resiliente, acessível, nutritivo e equitativo. Mas isso não prejudica seu valor para as partes interessadas que procuram orientação na preparação para o futuro altamente incerto do sistema alimentar global, seja o que for. Mas muito mais importante do que esses são os movimentos sem sugestões que esperamos sinceramente que as partes interessadas adotem para ajudar a criar um sistema alimentar mais justo e resiliente-que possa fornecer alimentos saudáveis, nutritivos e sustentáveis ​​para todos e garantir que as mendidades, os agricultores e os trabalhadores que se aprendem e a distribuídos e a distribuídos. Lee por suas contribuições para este artigo. Shalini Unnikrishnan

The probability that any of the scenarios we’ve imagined will come to pass precisely as described is quite small. But that doesn’t detract from their value to stakeholders looking for guidance in preparing for the global food system’s highly uncertain future, whatever it looks like.

All stakeholders should consider the contingent actions that we outline for each of the four scenarios. But far more important than these are the no-regret moves that we sincerely hope stakeholders will adopt to help create a fairer, more resilient food system—one that can provide healthy, nutritious, sustainable food for all and ensure secure livelihoods for the farmers and food workers who grow and distribute it.

The authors wish to thank Pilar Pedrinelli, Nicole Barman, Emily Fletcher, and David Lee for their contributions to this article.